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THE PRE-HISTORY OF SUBSIDIARITY IN
LEO XIII
MICHAEL P. MORELAND†
Christian Legal Thought is a much-anticipated contribution
from Patrick Brennan and William Brewbaker that brings the
resources of the Christian intellectual tradition to bear on law
and legal education. Among its many strengths, the book deftly
combines Catholic and Protestant contributions and scholarly
material with more widely accessible sources such as sermons
and newspaper columns. But no project aiming at a crisp and
manageably-sized presentation of Christianity’s contribution to
law could hope to offer a comprehensive treatment of particular
themes. And so, in this brief essay, I seek to elaborate upon the
treatment of the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social
thought.
Subsidiarity is mentioned a handful of times in Christian
Legal Thought, most squarely with a lengthy quotation from Pius
XI’s articulation of the principle in Quadragesimo Anno.1 In this
proposed elaboration of subsidiarity, I wish to broaden the
discussion of subsidiarity historically (back a few decades from
Quadragesimo Anno to the pontificate of Leo XIII) and
philosophically (most especially its relation to Leo XIII’s revival
of Thomism).2
Statements of the principle have historically been terse and
straightforward even if the application of subsidiarity to
particular legal questions has not.
For example, the
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, released in
2004 by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, devotes only
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POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, (1931) reprinted in CHRISTIAN LEGAL
THOUGHT: MATERIALS AND CASES 479–80 (2017).
2
Parts of this essay draw upon Michael P. Moreland, Subsidiarity and the
Safeguards of Federalism (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College)
(on file with author).
1
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two pages to the principle of subsidiarity.3 The historical origins
of subsidiarity are rooted in the Church’s opposition to
totalitarianism and various forms of collectivism4 and a
concomitant affirmation of human dignity.5
It is helpful to consider certain pitfalls posed by the current
debate over subsidiarity. One obstacle in arriving at a precise
understanding of subsidiarity is the tendency to view the
principle as one of limited government alone.6 As summarized by
Robert Sirico of the libertarian Acton Institute, this view holds
that:
The clear meaning of the subsidiarity principle is to limit the
powers and responsibilities assumed by the higher orders of
society. In nearly every occasion in which the principle has
been invoked in the last one hundred years of official Catholic
social teaching, it is in the context of limiting the uses of power.7

The U.S. Catholic bishops’ 1986 letter on the economy, Economic
Justice for All, expresses a similar view in some paragraphs of
the document: “This principle [of subsidiarity] states that, in
order to protect basic justice, government should undertake only
those initiatives which exceed the capacity of individuals or
private groups acting independently. Government should not
replace or destroy smaller communities and individual
initiative.”8
While this “liberal” interpretation of subsidiarity is an
important and enduring expression of the principle in the
literature, other sources suggest a less “libertarian” aspect to
3
COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶¶ 185–88, at 81–82
(2004). The Catechism of the Catholic Church states the principle as “a community
of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower
order, depriving the latter of its functions . . . .” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH ¶ 1883 (2d ed. 1997).
4
Louis Dupré, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 172, 191 (R. Bruce
Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J. eds., 1994).
5
Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question,
48 JURIST 298, 301–02 (1988).
6
See Christopher Wolfe, Subsidiarity: The “Other” Ground of Limited
Government, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM: THE
CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY,
81 (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley, & Robert P. Hunt eds., 1995).
7
Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and
Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549, 557 (1997).
8
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All:
Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy ¶ 124 (1986).
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subsidiarity.9 In the words of Quadragesimo Anno, “every social
activity ought of its nature to furnish help to the members of the
body social, and never destroy and absorb them.”10 Joseph
Komonchak notes that subsidiarity has both negative
(libertarian) and positive (communitarian) aspects:
The principle of subsidiarity requires positively that all
communities not only permit but enable and encourage
individuals to exercise their own self-responsibility and that
larger communities do the same for smaller ones . . . . It
requires negatively that communities not deprive individuals
and smaller communities of their right to exercise their selfresponsibility. Intervention, in other words, is only appropriate
as “helping people help themselves.”11

Part of the confusion over subsidiarity—but also, perhaps, an
aspect of the principle’s richness—is its combination, then, of
both “libertarian” and “communitarian” elements. Progress in
our understanding and application of subsidiarity will require a
careful assessment of these considerations and determining when
intervention or assistance [subsidium] from a higher authority is
needed and when devolution of responsibility is warranted. More
precisely, we will need to determine when authority is properly
located at a higher level and when authority is properly

9
I use the terms “liberal” and “libertarian” here cautiously, for there are
important differences in the conception of personhood underlying classical
liberalism—with its emphasis on individual autonomy—and subsidiarity. See Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Catholic Social Thought and Liberal America, in CATHOLICISM
AND LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 151, 159–62 (describing Catholic social thought in
general and subsidiarity in particular as “begin[ning] from a fundamentally different
ontology from that assumed and required by individualism, on the one hand, and
statist collectivism, on the other” and “refus[ing] stark alternatives between
individualism and collectivism”). The terms “libertarian” and “communitarian” in
the discussion to follow, then, are used in a broad sense (not, except by analogy, as
designating a particular political philosophical position) and merely denote different
aspects of subsidiarity as a principle favoring limited government but also
government intervention where appropriate.
10
POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931).
11
Komonchak, supra note 5, at 302 (emphasis in original); see also Dupré, supra
note 4, at 191:
The principle of subsidiarity . . . prevents the common good from assuming
an existence independent of private concerns, and thus turning into social
ideology. Only a social system based on subsidiarity can avoid turning the
state into either a mere legal sanction of individual interests (as in
nineteenth-century liberalism) or into a personification of a common good
in which individual interests are not adequately represented (as in the
dictatorial states of the twentieth century).
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recognized in the smaller community. This conclusion, in turn,
will require a discussion of subsidiarity’s political theoretical and
“anthropological” dimensions, that is, its grounding in a
conception of the person in society. Rather than as a principle
only of economic efficiency or limited government, subsidiarity is
best viewed as an aspect of Catholic social thought’s emphasis on
the human person adequately understood.12 Subsidiarity, I aim
to show, cannot be properly understood apart from an adequate
appreciation of the Catholic theory of political authority, of the
state, and of associational life.
I.

LEO XIII

Elected pope in 1878 at the age of sixty-seven, Leo XIII is
widely acknowledged to be the progenitor of modern Catholic
social teaching, even if a significant body of such social teaching
preceded his pontificate.13 Though he issued at least twelve
documents that could be considered to comprise his social
teaching,14 Leo’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum is the most
complete and enduring expression of his social theory. Rerum
Novarum contains lengthy sections on topics that will recur in
papal social encyclicals for the next century and that bear on
subsidiarity, such as private property, the Church’s hostility
toward liberalism and socialism, the rights of workers, and the
role of the Church in the social order. It is, however, Leo’s
12

See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation,
and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 615 (1993) (“The principle
[of subsidiarity] insists that the state and all other forms of community exist for the
individual.”).
13
For treatments of the pre-Leonine social tradition, see PAUL MISNER, SOCIAL
CATHOLICISM IN EUROPE: FROM THE ONSET OF INDUSTRIALIZATION TO THE FIRST
WORLD WAR, 149–52 (1991), and MICHAEL J. SCHUCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE
SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1740-1989, at 31–33 (1991).
14
In his collection Social Wellsprings, Joseph Husslein, S.J., includes
Inscrutabili (Evils of Society), Quod Apostolici Muneris (The Socialists), Arcanum
(Christian Marriage), Diuturnum (Civil Government), Immortale Dei (Christian
Constitution of States), In Plurimis (Abolition of African Slavery), Libertas Humana
(Human Liberty), Sapientiae Christianae (Chief Duties of Christian Citizens),
Laetitiae Sanctae (Rosary and Social Question), Annum Sacrum (Consecration of
Mankind to the Sacred Heart), and Graves de Communi (Christian Popular Action)
in addition to Rerum Novarum. JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS:
FOURTEEN EPOCHAL DOCUMENTS BY POPE LEO XIII (Bruce Publishing Company
1940). For a discussion of Husslein’s own important role in transmitting the papal
social encyclicals to the American Catholic Church, see Stephen A. Werner, Joseph
Husslein, S.J., and the American Catholic Literary Revival: “A University in Print,”
87 CATH. HIST. REV. 688, 696–97 (2001).
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nascent expression of the principle of subsidiarity throughout
Rerum Novarum that we will explore here. As noted by John
Courtney Murray, further elaboration of the principle of
subsidiarity and related concepts “are substantially in the line
set by Leo XIII when he defined the relation of government to the
social and economic order.”15
Leo ushered in the era of the “Leonine synthesis” in Catholic
social doctrine, which “reached its creative high-water mark in
the 1930s between the two world wars, but its effects were
consolidated at the Second Vatican Council (1962–65).”16 Leo’s
writing on social matters was broadly influenced by the
commitment to Thomism advanced in his 1879 encyclical Aeterni
Patris.17 This allegiance to Thomism was itself the product of a
contingent philosophical history and the influence of a small
circle of nineteenth century Jesuit Thomists, a history recounted
in recent years by Alasdair MacIntyre and Gerald McCool.18
Indeed, the Italian Jesuit Thomist Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio is
arguably the defining influence on the early formulation of what
would become the principle of subsidiarity and on much else in
Leo’s reappropriation of Thomism.19
A.

Rerum Novarum

Rerum Novarum’s theory of what the tradition will later
term “subsidiarity” is detailed amid the encyclical’s discussion of
four topics: private property, the family, the role of the state, and
the significance of associations. The encyclical begins with a
15
John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 551, 553 (1953).
16
John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander, THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 3, 11 (2007).
17
See generally POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER AETERNI PATRIS (1879).
18
See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL
ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 72–73 (1990); GERALD A.
MCCOOL, CATHOLIC THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR A
UNITARY METHOD 2, 17 (1977).
19
For an overview of the neo-Thomists of the period and their influence on Leo,
see JOE HOLLAND, MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: THE POPES CONFRONT
THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 1740–1958, at 119 (2003); MCCOOL, supra note 18; Thomas C.
Behr, Luigi Taparelli and the 19th-Century Neo-Thomistic “Revolution” in Natural
Law and Catholic Social Sciences (2000) (Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY Buffalo)
[hereinafter Behr, “Revolution”]; Thomas C. Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J.
(1793–1862) and the Development of Scholastic Natural-Law Thought as a Science of
Society and Politics, 6 J. MKTS. & MORALITY, 99 (2001) [hereinafter Behr,
Development].

FINAL_MORELAND

68

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

8/14/2018 9:10 PM

[Vol. 56:63

famous (and controversial) discussion of private property. In his
eagerness to distance the Church from various forms of socialism,
some argue that Leo implicitly adopted a modern, Lockean
theory of private property that sits uneasily with the Church’s
historical teaching on private property.20 Whatever the merits of
that argument, themes advanced in the paragraphs of Rerum
Novarum on private property will mark future discussions of
subsidiarity and do not turn, for the most part, on the theory of
private property advanced in the letter. Nonetheless, the early
paragraphs of Rerum Novarum set the Church’s social teaching
down on one side or another of several contentious issues in
modern political theory. Leo asserts the link between human
nature and private property at paragraph six,21 but this
argument is part of a larger argument about human nature and
the foundations of politics. Leo, then, stands in the long line of
Catholic—and particularly Thomist—argument regarding
natural law and moral knowledge.
The argument in paragraphs seven through seventeen
begins with an assertion about the proper relation of the person
to the state: “Man precedes the State [respublica], and possesses,
prior to the formation of any State [civitas], the right of providing
for the sustenance of his body.”22 This assertion about the person
and the state leads Leo to conclude, by way of a historical
argument, that private property is “pre-eminently in conformity
with human nature.”23 Similarly, the family has “rights and
duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded
more immediately in nature.”24 This argument regarding private

20
See Ernest L. Fortin, A.A., “Sacred and Inviolable”: Rerum Novarum and
Natural Rights, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 203, 204 (1992); B. Andrew Lustig, Natural
Law, Property, and Justice: The General Justification of Property in John Locke, 19
J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 119, 143–44 (1991); Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Property,
and Redistribution, 21 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 165, 165–67 (1993); B. Andrew Lustig,
Property, Justice, and the Common Good: A Response to Paul J. Weithman, 21 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 181, 183–84, 186 (1993).
21
RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 14, ¶ 6.
22
Id. ¶ 7.
23
Id. ¶ 11.
24
Id. ¶ 13. See also id. ¶ 12, in which Leo writes of “the family, the ‘society’ of a
man’s house—a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society,
and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to
itself which are quite independent of the State.”
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property and the family builds to Leo’s rejection of “the main
tenet of socialism, community goods” as “directly contrary to the
natural rights of mankind.”25
It might be difficult at first glance to see the relevance of this
discussion of private property, the family, and socialism to
subsidiarity, but Leo lays the groundwork for such an argument
with his claim that it is “impossible to reduce civil society to one
dead level.”26 This argument will, however, turn not toward a
discussion of levels of civil society and the apportionment of
responsibility among them—as one would expect were
subsidiarity the principal subject—but instead to the topic of
natural differences among human capacities and the inequality
that results. The next several paragraphs of the encyclical take
up the appropriate response to the plight of the poor and the
responsibility of the state and civil society to alleviate the
condition of the poor, all while taking care not to frame the
discussion in terms of class struggle.27
This aspect of social harmony is on display, for example, in
paragraph nineteen, where Leo writes that “[j]ust as the
symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable
arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it
ordained by nature that these two classes [the ‘wealthy’ and
‘working men’] should dwell in harmony and agreement.”28 But
lest this assertion of irreducible harmony among the classes in
society lead to neglect of the poor, Leo moves to a set of
exhortations regarding the church’s charitable work.
“The
Church . . . intervenes directly in behalf of the poor,” he writes,
“by setting on foot and maintaining many associations which she
knows to be efficient for the relief of poverty.”29
One of the principal questions posed by the contemporary
debate over subsidiarity—when is intervention by a higher level
of civil authority in the affairs of a local community warranted?—
is expressly addressed only once in Rerum Novarum, in

25

Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17.
27
Id. ¶¶ 19–30.
28
Id. ¶ 19.
29
Id. ¶ 29. The Church’s own charitable work is a theme running throughout
papal social teaching, even where the tradition is at pains to emphasize the
responsibility of the state and the wider society. See POPE BENEDICT XVI, DEUS
CARITAS EST ¶¶ 31–39 (2005).
26
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paragraph thirty-six.30 Paragraphs thirty-one and following treat
the proper role of the state,31 and paragraph thirty-five asserts
that the state “must not absorb the individual or the family; both
should be allowed free and untrammelled action so far as is
consistent with the common good and the interests of others.”32
Paragraph thirty-six then proceeds to ask when the state must
intervene.33 The clearest requirement for such intervention,
according to Leo, is where it is necessary for “peace and good
order.”34 But Leo goes on to argue that “[t]he limits [of the
intervention of public authority] must be determined by the
nature of the occasion which calls for the law’s interference—the
principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor
proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the
removal of the mischief.”35
The paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that arguably bear most
directly on subsidiarity are Leo’s short but suggestive discussion
of civil society and associations at paragraph fifty-one and
following:
These lesser societies and the larger society differ in many
respects, because their immediate purpose and aim is different.
Civil society exists for the common good, and hence is concerned
with the interests of all in general, albeit with individual
interests also in their due place and degree . . . . Private
societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and
are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be
absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to
enter into a “society” of this kind is the natural right of man;
and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to
destroy them; and, if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it
contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both they
and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural
tendency of man to dwell in society.36

30

RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 14, ¶ 36.
Id. ¶¶ 31–38.
32
Id. ¶ 35.
33
Id. ¶ 36.
34
Id. The examples of what constitutes “peace and good order” illustrate that
Leo has in mind more than mere avoidance of civil war or warding off the Hobbesian
state, as when he writes “that all things should be carried on in accordance with
God’s laws and those of nature” and “that the discipline of family life should be
observed and that religion should be obeyed.” Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. ¶ 51.
31
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Leo immediately qualifies this assertion of associational rights
with the claim that “[t]here are occasions, doubtless, when it is
fitting that the law should intervene to prevent certain
associations, as when men join together for purposes which are
evidently bad, unlawful, or dangerous to the State.”37
With this spare statement of the limits of state intervention,
Leo laid the groundwork for the elaboration of subsidiarity in
later papal documents.
Reconstructing Leo’s discussion of
subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, we can identify three main
themes running through the paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that
bear on subsidiarity: (1) a rejection of socialism and an inchoate
preference for the limited state; (2) a defense of private property;
and (3) an extended treatment of the role of the family. We can
already see in this, the first and perhaps most important
document in the papal social tradition, subsidiarity being
invoked as an aspect of the Church’s rejection of totalitarianism,
which, in turn, was originally an argument directed toward
socialism and its rejection of private property rights. Following
the criticism of socialism by way of a defense of private property,
the encyclical then turns to a treatment of civil society and the
role of the state. In summary, Leo’s argument is that (1)
differences and inequalities are based on differing capacities,
which gives rise to the condition of the poor; (2) assistance to the
poor requires the intervention of the state, just as the state
otherwise intervenes appropriately for peace and good order; and
(3) associations of workers and, more generally, public and
private societies are a means of complementing the role of the
state.
B.

Aeterni Patris and Immortale Dei

Though Rerum Novarum is, by a considerable margin, the
document from the reign of Leo with which most are familiar, it
is important to note the setting of Rerum Novarum among the
other major encyclicals of Leo’s pontificate.
Two warrant
particular attention here: Leo’s 1879 encyclical on Christian
philosophy, Aeterni Patris, and his 1885 letter on the Christian
constitution of states, Immortale Dei.

37

Id. ¶ 52.
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Reading Rerum Novarum apart from Aeterni Patris, it is
difficult to appreciate the place of Leo’s (and his successors’)
social teaching within the Catholic intellectual tradition
generally and the Thomist tradition more specifically. Even if it
is difficult to trace each turn in twentieth century social teaching
to its Thomist roots, Thomism is both a methodological and
substantive component of Catholic social teaching, including the
principle of subsidiarity.38 Methodologically, the Thomism of
Aeterni Patris supplied a resource for criticism of modern
rationalism, as argued by Alasdair MacIntyre:
Aeterni Patris summoned its readers to renewal of an
understanding of intellectual enquiry as the continuation of a
specific type of tradition, that which achieved definitive
expression in the writings of Aquinas, one the appropriation of
which could not only provide the resources for radical criticism
of the conception of rationality dominant in nineteenth-century
modernity . . . but also preserve and justify the canonical status
of the Bible as distinct from, yet hegemonic over, all secular
enquiry.39

Substantively, the legacy of Thomism is apparent in the
prevalence of natural law theory in Catholic social teaching. In
contrast to, for example, the resort to scriptural metaphors often
encountered in Protestant social ethics (such as the American
Social Gospel Movement of the early twentieth century), Catholic
social teaching has frequently relied on philosophical forms of
argument that do not presuppose the principles of Christian
revelation.
The previous discussion of Rerum Novarum may mislead the
reader into believing that document was an encyclical on church
and state. To be clear, Rerum Novarum was not a document on
church and state in the juridical sense but rather was addressed
to social (and not merely economic) matters, particularly the
family and the relationship of capital and labor. A shorter and
more explicit statement of Leo’s views on church and state is to
be found six years before Rerum Novarum in his encyclical

38
For a recent attempt to recover the relevance of Aquinas to subsidiarity, see
Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism, and the Best Constitution: Thomas
Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & PHIL. 161 (2007).
39
MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 25.
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Immortale Dei. There one finds the initial articulations in
modern Catholic social thought of a broadly Thomist
understanding of the state and society:
Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he
cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary
requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his
mental and moral faculties. Hence, it is divinely ordained that
he should lead his life—be it family, or civil—with his fellow
men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately
supplied. But, as no society can hold together unless some one
be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good,
every body politic must have a ruling authority, and this
authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature,
and has, consequently, God for its Author.40

Immortale Dei’s purpose, however, was not to contribute to
an overall Catholic theory of the state and the relationship
among social forms, as would be most relevant to a treatment of
subsidiarity. Instead, and as noted by John Courtney Murray in
his seminal articles on Leo’s doctrine of church and state, the
predominant concern in Immortale Dei and related encyclicals
was the problem of religious freedom—religious freedom in the
modern state, the role of conscience with respect to the state, and
the church’s role in the modern state.41
II. LUIGI TAPARELLI D’AZEGLIO
Luigi Taparelli (1793–1862) taught the future Leo XIII at
the Collegio Romano in the 1820s and was a decisive influence on
Leonine social doctrine and on Leo’s adoption of Thomism.42
Appreciation of Taparelli’s significance is hindered in the
Anglophone world by the lack of any English translations of his
work and only passing attention to Taparelli in the work of
historians of nineteenth century theology such as Gerald McCool.

40

Pope Leo XIII, IMMORTALE DEI ¶ 3 (1885).
John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII on Church and State: The General
Structure of the Controversy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1 (1953); John Courtney
Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 145
(1953); Murray, supra note 15, at 551; John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two
Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture, 15 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 1 (1954).
42
In much of the following discussion, I am indebted to Thomas C. Behr’s Luigi
Taparelli and the Nineteenth-Century Neo-Scholastic ‘Revolution’ in Natural Law
and Catholic Social Sciences. See generally Behr, “Revolution,” supra note 19.
41
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In Heinrich Rommen’s minor classic The State in Catholic
Thought, for example, Taparelli is mentioned only three times,
two of which are citations to his opposition to universal
suffrage.43
From the important recent dissertation and
subsequent writings of historian Thomas Behr, however, we can
begin to understand the influence of Taparelli on the initial
stages of modern Catholic social teaching.
Taparelli was an important part of the nineteenth century
Thomist revival that culminated in Aeterni Patris. He was also a
regular contributor to the Jesuit periodical Civiltà Cattolica for
several years and is credited with developing the concept of
“social justice.”44
Taparelli’s most significant work was
Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right Based on Fact [Saggio
teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto], which he
compiled in response to the lack of any textbook on natural law
that was free, in his view, from misleading doctrines.45 As
summarized by Thomas Behr, “His thoroughly Thomistic
intention was to merge a deductive, theoretical approach with an
inductive historico-sociological approach in a dialectical method
that would form the basis of a modern science of society and
politics.”46
Taparelli’s most important contribution to Catholic social
doctrine was his development of the basic framework for later
discussions of the principle of subsidiarity. As Behr argues,
Taparelli used a series of metaphors derived from grammar to
illustrate the concept of “Hypotactic Right,” “[t]he natural and
just relationships between the myriad of associations that human
beings tend to form, ranging from the family to the State and

43
HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 110, 437, 458
(1945). In his book Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization
to the First World War, Paul Misner covers Taparelli’s contribution to Leonine social
doctrine in two pages, though Misner calls attention to the influence of Taparelli and
to the Jesuit periodical Civiltà Cattolica with which Taparelli was closely associated.
See MISNER, supra note 13.
44
See Behr, Development, supra note 19, at 99; see also Walter T. Odell, The
Political Theory of Civiltà Cattolica from 1850 to 1870 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University).
45
See Behr, Development, supra note 18, at 101. Pius XI cites and commends
Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale in a footnote to his encyclical Divini Illius
Magistri as “a work never sufficiently praised and recommended to university
students.” POPE PIUS XI, DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ¶ 50 n.33 (1929).
46
Behr, Development, supra note 19, at 102–03.

FINAL_MORELAND

2017]

8/14/2018 9:10 PM

THE PRE-HISTORY OF SUBSIDIARITY

75

beyond.”47 Behr explains that Taparelli borrowed the term
“hypotactic” from the rules of Greek grammar governing “the
modalities of coordination between clauses, specifically, the
arrangement of inferior clauses within the functioning of the
whole sentence.”48 “Hypotactic Right” [dritto ipotattico], then,
“convey[s] the rights of social groupings, within their just
relationships, organized toward the common good.”49 Behr
concludes:
The principles [Taparelli] elaborates in this regard have found
their place, though indirectly and imperfectly, in Catholic social
doctrine, known as the “principle of subsidiarity,” first explicitly
used by Pius XI in the social encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno.
Indeed, the Greek hypo taxis can be rendered directly into Latin
as sub sedeo. The Latin expression subsidia applied, then, not
just to mean “help” but in the first instance to auxiliary troops
within the Roman legion, as they “sat below” ready in reserve to
support the battle. The “help” in this context is from the bottom
up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating groups
all participate in achieving the common good of the more perfect
association. While Taparelli uses the legion as an analogy for
society in various contexts, the rights and obligations derived
from the laws of subsidiarity vary according to a host of
historical considerations and competing rights and obligations.50

As the principle of subsidiarity came to be expressed in the
social thought of Pius XI and later popes, we will see that some of
the original inspiration for the principle in Taparelli’s and Leo’s
Thomism came to be forgotten or neglected. For example,
Taparelli’s articulation of Hypotactic Right is clearly not a
principle of devolution, as the principle of subsidiarity is so often
understood in later Catholic social teaching.
Rather, the
principle of subsidiarity is, at least as originally articulated in
the nineteenth century Thomists, a principle of right social
ordering toward the common good. The variation among the
“rights and obligations derived from the laws of subsidiarity”
does, however, indeed depend on contingent historical
circumstances when we would seek to employ subsidiarity in
navigating particular policy questions.

47
48
49
50

Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
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The papal social tradition broadly and the teaching on the
principle of subsidiarity specifically have, of course, developed
significantly since Rerum Novarum. In the pertinent sections
anticipating subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, Leo worked within
the scholastic framework to advance a social theory that began
with the family and private property and then built up to the
initial formulation of a doctrine of the state. As formulated by
Johannes Messner, the principle of subsidiarity “obliges the state
authority to take heed of the common good, preferably by means
of subordinate authorities, namely, those of member societies in
an organization of the state community based on the federative
and corporative principles.”51

51
JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
214 (J.J. Doherty trans., 1949). Messner goes on to note that this relation between
subsidiarity and the common good has important implications for the theory of the
state:
The principle of subsidiarity function, however, certainly does not signify a
weak state standing without authority face to face with a pluralistic
society. On the contrary, the more strongly the character of society develops
in its federative and corporative branches, both regional and occupational,
in conjunction with a plurality of free associations based on economic group
interests, the more clearly does the common good principle call for a state
with strong authority which will enable it, in a pluralistic society with
diversified competencies and interests, to carry out its essential functions:
namely, to care for the common good and the general interest.

